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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
No. 16-2734 
    




        Appellant 
    
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-14-cr-0207-002) 
District Judge:  Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
    
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2017 
    
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, 
and SIMANDLE, Senior District Judge*
(Filed: August 25, 2017) 
    
OPINION** 
    
SIMANDLE, Senior District Judge. 
                                              
* Hon Jerome B. Simandle, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of New Jersey, 
sitting by designation. 
 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Appellant Thomas Ray seeks review of a sentence imposed following his plea of 
guilty to the offense of distribution of oxycodone within 1,000 feet of a school in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) & 860(a).  The sentence was made partially 
concurrent and partially consecutive to an undischarged aggregate state term of 
imprisonment on seven separate charges, of which two were determined to relate to the 
present offense.  The District Court also granted the Government’s motion for a 
downward departure for substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. 
 On appeal, Ray raises two grounds, alleging that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it limited the length of concurrency of the sentence, and that the 
determination of the extent of the downward departure under § 5K1.1 was procedurally 
deficient and an abuse of discretion. 
 This Court has jurisdiction to review the sentence as to concurrency pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), but we lack jurisdiction to review the extent of 
downward departure for substantial assistance, as explained below. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Investigation revealed that Ray was a patient of Dr. John Terry, who was then a 
medical doctor in Wellsboro, Pennsylvania.  Ray admitted that Dr. Terry would prescribe 
drugs to him -- primarily oxycodone -- that were not medically necessary.  Ray admitted 
that he illegally sold every pill he was provided, earning an estimated $200,000 from 
distributing approximately 10,109 oxycodone tablets.  PSR ¶¶ 5-8.  The total quantity of 
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oxycodone involved in this offense was 321.97 grams, which converted to 2,157.20 
kilograms of marijuana for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, 
which yielded a base offense level of 31 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(2).  PSR ¶ 14.  
With an adjustment of three points for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) 
& (b), the Total Offense Level was 28 and Ray’s Criminal History Category was IV.  
PSR ¶¶ 21-22, 36.  The recommended Guideline Range was thus 110-137 months, which 
is undisputed on appeal. 
 Meanwhile, Ray was serving an undischarged aggregate term of imprisonment for 
seven state convictions in Tioga County, Pennsylvania, some of which also concerned 
Ray’s relationship with Dr. Terry, see PSR ¶¶ 28-34, which combined to a state sentence 
of 51-180 months.  These included: 
1)   Tioga County Court case 33-2013, Possession with Intent to Deliver a 
Controlled Substance.  
 This case arose out of one of the 2012 controlled buys discussed above, and 
resulted in a sentence of 16-60 months to be served concurrently with Tioga 
County Court case 305-2014. PSR ¶ 28. 
 
 2) Tioga County Court case 305-2014, Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Oxycodone.  
  This case arose out of a 2014 controlled buy conducted by state investigators. 
It resulted in a sentence of 21-60 months. PSR ¶ 29. 
 
3) Tioga County Court case 322-2014, Theft by Unlawful Taking.  
 This case arose out of Ray’s theft of $30,000 and other items from Dr. 
Terry’s residence. It resulted in a sentence of 16-60 months to be served 
concurrent with Tioga County Court case 305-2014. PSR ¶ 30. 
 
4) Tioga County Court case 321-2014, Burglary. 
This case arose out of Ray’s theft of $300,000 from a safe contained in one 
of Dr. Terry’s vehicles. It resulted in a sentence of 14-60 months to be served 
consecutively to Tioga County Court case 305-2014. PSR ¶ 31. 
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5)  Tioga County Court case 401-2014, Criminal Solicitation - Burglary. 
This case arose out of Ray’s conspiring to commit a burglary of Dr. Terry’s 
home with an undercover operative. It resulted in a sentence of 16-60 months 
to be served consecutively to Tioga County Court cases 305-2014 & 321 -
2014. PSR ¶ 32. 
 
6 ) Tioga County Court case 402-2014, Bad Checks. 
This case arose out of Ray’s writing of $1,000 worth of checks drawing on a 
closed account. It resulted in a sentence of 9-60 months to be served 
concurrently with Tioga County Court case 401-2014. PSR ¶ 33. 
 
7) Tioga County Court case 459-2014, Bad Checks. 
This case arose out of Ray’s writing of over $2,000 worth of checks drawing 
on “unlocated” or closed accounts.  It resulted in a sentence of 9-60 months 
to be served concurrently with Tioga County Court case 321-2014. PSR ¶ 34. 
 
 Of these seven Tioga County convictions, the Presentence Investigation Report 
classified only two as arising from conduct that was related to the instant federal offense 
(PSR ¶ 67), while five were deemed unrelated for concurrency purposes.  The PSR 
deemed the first two convictions (at PSR ¶¶ 28-29) to be related, specifically the 
convictions for possession with intent to deliver oxycodone, such that of the aggregate 
sentence of 51 months, a total of 21 months was related to the federal charge.  (PSR ¶ 
67.)  The PSR deemed the remaining five convictions aggregating 30 months (PSR ¶¶ 30-
34) as unrelated to the present offense.  In other words, according to the PSR, the three 
crimes in which Ray committed burglary of Dr. Terry’s residence and theft from Dr. 
Terry’s car (PSR ¶¶ 30-32), and the two convictions for writing bad checks (PSR ¶¶ 33-
34), were deemed unrelated to Ray’s federal conviction for Ray’s distribution of 




 At sentencing, the District Court agreed that only the two Tioga County charges 
for possession with intent to deliver should be considered related.  The District Judge 
found a proper distinction to be drawn between Ray’s federal crime of distribution and 
the burglary, theft, and check charges.  (App. 23a, 26a.)  The District Judge determined 
that 21 months’ credit would be given by way of concurrency, since 21 months was the 
portion of the undischarged aggregate state sentence for the related convictions. 
 Further, the Court granted the Government’s motion for a downward departure for 
substantial assistance under § 5K1.1 and awarded a two-level departure, considering and 
rejecting Ray’s arguments for a greater departure.  (App. 7a) 
 With the two-level departure for substantial assistance, the new advisory 
Guidelines Range, determined by a Total Offense Level of 26 and Criminal History 
Category of IV, was 92-115 months.  Subtracting a 21-month adjustment (for the extent 
of concurrency of the related portion of the undischarged state sentence) from the bottom 
end of the range resulted in a sentence of 71 months to run concurrently with the 
sentences in Tioga County Cases 33-2013 and 305-2014, and consecutively to the 
sentences in Tioga County Cases 322-2014, 321-2014, 401-2014, 402-2014, and 459-
2014.  (Appellant’s Br. and App., Judgment, p.2.) 
 This appeal timely followed.  
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III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Extent of Concurrency 
 
 Ray asserts that the District Court abused its discretion when it limited the length 
of concurrency to 21 months when it recognized only two of the seven state convictions 
as related to his federal conviction.  Ray argues that the court erred in not recognizing 
other state convictions as sufficiently related to increase the period of concurrency.  Ray 
acknowledges that the District Court adjusted his sentence to reflect the relatedness of 21 
months of conduct (that is, distribution of prescription medication dispensed by Dr. 
Terry), but he argues that three other convictions, in PSR ¶¶ 30, 31, and 32, also involved 
relevant conduct to the federal offense pursuant to the policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 
5G1.3(b).  These three crimes, as noted, involved Ray stealing (or plotting to do so) from 
Dr. Terry by burglarizing his residence and stealing $300,000 cash from his vehicle, that 
is, crimes by Ray against Terry as his victim. 
 “[D]ecisions to impose a particular concurrent or consecutive sentence are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Whether a federal sentence is imposed to be served concurrently or consecutively 
is left to the discretion of the sentencing court.  Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 
(2012) (noting federal courts “have discretion to select whether the sentences they impose 
will run concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences that they impose, or 
that have been imposed in other proceedings, including state proceedings.”).  Under 18 
U.S.C. § 3584(a), the sentencing court may impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence.  
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United States v. Spiers, 82 F.3d 1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1996).  Likewise, authority to 
impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence is recognized in the Sentencing Guidelines, 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).  The sentence may be concurrent, partially concurrent, or 
consecutive in order to “achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense,” 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d). 
 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) incorporates the provisions of § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(3) for the 
purposes of identifying relevant conduct for concurrency purposes.  Section 1B1.3(a)(1) 
applies to criminal acts undertaken by the defendant “that occurred during the 
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course 
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 
 Although not addressing the tests for relatedness under § 1B1.3(a)(1), Ray argues 
that the other three state convictions involving Dr. Terry as a victim were nonetheless 
related for concurrency consideration because Dr. Terry was the “common denominator,” 
the theft and burglary offenses occurred during the same general time frame as the federal 
distribution charge, and in the same place -- Tioga County.  (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) 
 The District Court determined that these other crimes were unrelated to the 
conduct in the federal crime of conviction.  It is apparent that the burglary and theft did 
not occur during the commission of the federal offense but instead afterwards, since Ray 
acknowledges these state crimes were a response to the fact that Dr. Terry had lost his 
license and Ray could not continue to get prescriptions from him (Appellant’s Br. at 10).  
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That Ray victimized his former supplier does not equate to crimes “during” Ray’s 
distribution of the controlled substances, nor in preparation for those sales, nor as part of 
an attempt to avoid responsibility for those sales.  
 Nor were the three disputed state crimes part of a “common scheme or plan” or 
same “course of conduct” to be considered relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(2).  The Tioga County burglary and theft had no common factor such as 
common accomplices, purposes, or modus operandi, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), App. 
Note 5(B).  Certainly Dr. Terry’s roles as drug supplier in the related crimes and as 
victim of Ray’s burglary and theft in the unrelated ones, support the distinction.  The 
agreement between Ray and Dr. Terry to possess and distribute oxycodone obviously 
could not have included agreement by Dr. Terry to be victimized in his home and vehicle 
by Ray. 
 It is also apparent that, under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), the unrelated cases do not 
involve the same or similar harm as the instant case.  Ray’s seizure of property and 
currency from Dr. Terry in the unrelated Tioga County cases is hardly the same as the 
harm to others from distribution of oxycodone in the present case. 
 Thus, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that its sentence would be concurrent only for the 21 months of the related Tioga County 
sentences that Ray was serving, and consecutive with regard to the other Tioga County 
sentences being served aggregating 30 months.   
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 Ray’s final argument -- that the District Court should have found a broader 
concurrency under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) -- also lacks merit.  The District Court carefully 
parsed the state sentences that Ray was already serving.  As noted, the policy statement in 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) permits a court to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or 
consecutive sentence in any other case in which a defendant is subject to a prior 
undischarged term of imprisonment in order “to achieve a reasonable punishment for the 
instant offense.”  Section 5G1.3(d) is only permissive (“the sentence for the instant 
offense may be imposed. . .”) (emphasis added), as the goal of § 5G1.3(d) is a sentence 
that amounts to a “reasonable punishment” for the instant offense.  Id. 
 When applying § 5G1.3(d), the sentencing court has broad discretion.  The 
underlying statute at 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) identifies, in broadest terms, that “[t]he court in 
determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or 
consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is 
being imposed, the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”  18 U.S.C. § 3584(b).  While Ray 
argues that the sentencing court failed to sufficiently consider the § 3553(a) factors, the 
record indicates otherwise.  The District Judge carefully indicated exactly how he was 
determining the sentence, namely, by considering each of the § 3553(a) factors and then 
adjusting the sentence downward by 21 months, crediting the state sentences on the two 
related distribution crimes.  (App. 20a-24a.)  The sentence that resulted, 92 months, was 
at the low end of the guideline range, and it was adjusted downward by 21 months, to a 
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sentence of 71 months consecutive to the state sentences being served on the five Tioga 
County crimes found to be unrelated.  (App. 22A-23A.) 
 The sentencing court’s explanation for the reasons of this sentence dealt with all 
relevant arguments and circumstances.  More elaborate findings are not required.  See 
United States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2000) (no requirement for specific 
findings under § 5G1.3). 
 We hold the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in determining the degree 
of concurrency of the instant sentence. 
B.  Extent of § 5K1.1 Departure 
 Ray asserts that the District Court’s decision to grant a downward departure of two 
levels upon the Government’s motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 was “procedurally 
deficient and an abuse of discretion.”  Appellant's Br. at 13. 
 Ray argues that the circumstances of his case justified more than a “meager” 
departure of two levels for his cooperation.  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  He argues that the 
two levels are insufficient to recognize the extent, significance, and value of his 
cooperation, citing such circumstances as its early timing, attendance at two proffers, its 
value in obtaining the search warrant for Dr. Terry’s residence, and its promotion of the 
guilty pleas of the three remaining co-defendants.  (Appellant’s Br. at 14, citing App. 5a-
7a, 41a-45a.) 
 The sentencing judge reviewed the Government’s motion and explicitly applied 
the factors to be considered in determining the extent of departure in United States v. 
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Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 146-49 (3d Cir. 2001).  The judge well understood the timing, 
nature, significance, and reliability of Ray’s cooperation, reciting appropriate findings.  
(App. 3a-4a).  After listening to further argument and counsel’s request for a four-level 
departure, the court declined to grant a larger departure, finding that “the assistance 
actually is quite consistent with a two-level downward departure.  And I have had cases 
that have been very similar in terms of the level of cooperation.  And I believe that a two-
level downward departure is appropriate.  I don’t believe that a four-level departure is 
appropriate.”  (App. 7a.) 
 Where, as here, the District Court considered the relevant circumstances of 
cooperation and was fully aware of its discretion to grant the motion for departure, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the extent of a District Court’s departure. United States 
v. Watson, 482 F.3d 269, 271 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We do not have jurisdiction to review 
a District Court’s discretionary decision to deny a departure or appeals by defendants 
challenging the extent of a downward departure,” citing United States v. Cooper, 437 
F.3d 324, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 141 n.9 
(3d Cir. 2010) (jurisdiction lacking to review denial of downward departure under § 
5K1.1 unless sentencing court “was unaware of its discretion to grant the motion. ” 
(citation omitted)). 
 Ray argues that an exception to the jurisdictional bar permits review of the extent 
of a downward departure, such as in United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 1995).  
In King, this Court reviewed the sentencing court’s determination of a three-level 
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departure upon granting a § 5K1.1 motion, where the judge stated that it was always his 
practice to grant a three-level departure on § 5K1.1 motions.  Id. at 590.  The record 
lacked evidence of the individualized determination required for such departures and the 
sentencing judge substituted a personal across-the-board practice, causing the Court to 
remand for resentencing.  Id. at 591-92.  The present determination, on the other hand, 
contained individualized recitation and consideration of Ray’s specific cooperation.  The 
District Judge found Ray’s cooperation was comparable to cases for which a two-level 
departure is appropriate, and he did not announce a personal across-the-board policy of a 
fixed departure for all cases.  This again was an individualized determination comparing 
Ray’s degree of cooperation with other similar cases.  This is a reasonable way of seeking 
comparability in sentencing cooperators, consistent with the factor of avoiding undue 
disparity in sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  Where this proper mode of 
analysis leads -- that is, the extent of downward departure -- is unreviewable by this 
Court. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the final 
judgment of conviction and sentence entered on May 26, 2016. 
